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In this article, Prof. Knake reviews the ten cases related to the role
of attorneys and the practice of law scheduled to be argued before the
Supreme Court during the October 2009 term. This term marks a highwater mark in the number of professional responsibility cases that will
be heard before the Court, and Prof. Knake surveys the cases to gain
insights into the Court’s increased interest in questions that address the
role of attorneys. Prof. Knake posits that the unprecedented number of
professional responsibility cases, when considered together, signal the
Court’s significant prioritization of concerns related to the roles and
obligations of attorneys.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 term features an
unprecedented number of cases addressing fundamental aspects of
professional responsibility and regulation of the legal profession. At
the time of this writing, the Court has granted petitions for certiorari
in ten cases related to the role of attorneys and the practice of law.
This body of cases represents a significant departure from dockets in
recent history, where typically the Court has considered no more than
two or three matters involving the ethical obligations and legal duties
1
of attorneys (and at times none).
The questions presented in these cases will force the Court to
confront the following issues: the First Amendment rights of attorneys
to give advice and to advertise; the standards for finding ineffective
assistance of counsel when an attorney gives faulty advice, employs
questionable trial strategy, lacks the requisite experience, or misses a
critical filing deadline; the right to an immediate appeal of challenged
attorney-client privilege waivers; the calculation of attorney fees
awarded under fee-shifting statutes as well as whether an attorney
holds a property right in such an award; and the extent to which a
prosecuting attorney may be liable for civil damages for procuring
false testimony and introducing it at trial. The cases are surveyed
below in an effort to gain insights into the Court’s increased interest
in questions that address the role of attorneys.
This essay argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to devote
2
over ten percent of its time during the 2009-2010 term to matters
1. In a typical term the Supreme Court hears three or fewer such cases at most, and
sometimes none. See infra notes155–158and accompanying text.
2. To date, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to sixty-two cases, ten (or 16%) of
which include issues centrally related to the law of lawyering. The Court may very well add
more cases before the term ends. Even if it does not, these ten cases will represent over 10% of
the Court’s agenda assuming that it grants review to a total of approximately 80-85 cases (during
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involving the law of lawyering is noteworthy not only for the
individual issues to be resolved but also for the cases’ existence,
indeed dominance, on the docket. The law of lawyering is an oftignored but vitally important field necessary for ensuring the proper
function of our justice system and our democratic form of
government. The outcomes of these cases have the potential to impact
the work of many attorneys in meaningful ways and, when considered
together, signal the Court’s significant prioritization of concerns
related to the roles and obligations of attorneys.

II. A PREVIEW OF THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CASES ON
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2009–2010 DOCKET
A. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States: Attorney
Advice and Advertising
One of the more important issues facing the Court this term
focuses on the First Amendment protection that attorney advice and
advertising deserves, albeit in a rather unlikely context: a
constitutional challenge to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
3
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). On its surface
4
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al. v. United States appears to be
5
about prevention of bankruptcy abuses, yet the more consequential
considerations are whether Congress can place limits on otherwise
lawful legal advice and compel certain disclosures in attorney
6
advertisements.
Some explanation of the BAPCPA is necessary to understand how
the Court may resolve this appeal. Congress enacted the BAPCPA
after considering eight years of testimony and reports on the
pervasive and increasing problems of fraud within the bankruptcy
7
system. The BAPCPA targeted both debtors and attorneys who
the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 terms the Court granted review to 78 and 87 cases, respectively).
3
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C., and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
4. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted 129 S. Ct. 2766 (2009), consolidated with United States v. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,
P.A., 129 S. Ct. 2769 (2009).
5. Milavetz, 541 F.3d 785.
6. Id.
7. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 688–89 (2008) (providing detail on BAPCPA’s
origins).
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engaged or appeared to engage in abusive practices.
The BAPCPA includes regulations applicable not only to debtors,
but also to “debt relief agencies,” a term that has been construed by a
majority of courts, including the Eighth Circuit in Milavetz, to
8
encompass attorneys. These regulations include a prohibition on
certain advice offered by an attorney to a debtor-client regarding the
9
accumulation of additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy, and
a mandatory inclusion of the following disclosure in advertising by an
attorney who offers bankruptcy-related advice: “We are a debt relief
agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the
10
Bankruptcy Code.”
Shortly after the enactment of the BAPCPA, the Milavetz
plaintiffs—two attorneys, their law firm, and two clients—filed a
lawsuit against the federal government. They challenged the
application of the debt relief agency classification to attorneys, as well
as the advice prohibition and the mandatory advertising disclosures.
The Eighth Circuit ultimately struck down the advice prohibition but
upheld the advertising disclosures. Both sides appealed.
At a time when attorney regulation has come under intense
scrutiny, particularly in the areas of finance and bankruptcy given the
recent economic tumult, this case has weighty repercussions for
clients who need complete legal advice about bankruptcy and for
their attorneys who are under ethical obligations to deliver that
guidance. The regulations run counter to an attorney’s established
ethical duties under the American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to “provide competent
11
12
representation” and “render candid advice,” as well as “not make a
13
false or misleading communication about the . . . lawyer’s services.”
Should the Supreme Court declare the challenged regulations
8. The BAPCPA defines the term “debt relief agency” as “any person who provides any
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other
valuable consideration . . . ” 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12A) (West Supp. 2009).
9. The BAPCPA provides in pertinent part that “[a] debt relief agency shall not—advise
an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such
person filing [for bankruptcy].” 11 U.S.C.A. § 526(a)(4).
10. The BAPCPA requires the disclosure (or something substantially similar) in any
advertisement for “bankruptcy assistance services” or referencing “the benefits of bankruptcy”
or any advertisement regarding “assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage
foreclosures, eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay
any consumer debt.” 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 528(a)(3), (4); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 528(b)(2)(A), (B).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (2009).
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 2.1.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1; see also MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT, R.
7.1 (adopting Model Rule 7.1).
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constitutional, this case could detrimentally affect the ability of
attorneys to provide complete advice and advertising free of
arguably-inaccurate disclaimers not only in bankruptcy practice but
14
also in other areas of law. A number of the cases before the Court
this term raise similar concerns about the rights and obligations of the
attorney together with those of the client.
B. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Attorney Advice Again
A second federal statute limiting the guidance that attorneys may
give to their clients is challenged in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
15
Project. While this case touches on a range of concerns well beyond
the law of lawyering, certain provisions before the Court apply
directly to the advice a lawyer may give to clients. The Antiterrorism
16
and Effective Death Penalty Act and its amendment, the
17
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, criminalize
18
“expert advice or assistance” given to any group designated as “a
19
foreign terrorist organization” even if such support is for nonviolent
20
activities or humanitarian efforts. “Expert advice or assistance” is
21
defined as “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”
This prohibition was challenged by the Humanitarian Law Project,
among others, which sought to provide support to the Kurdistan
Workers Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for
nonviolent and lawful peace-making activities. This support included
22
“offer[ing] their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements.”
The Ninth Circuit held that the “other specialized knowledge”
14. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., A Debt-Defying Act: Courts say part of embattled
bankruptcy law violates First Amendment, J. AMER. BAR ASS’N. (Jan. 2009) (quoting Joseph R.
Prochaska, immediate-past chair of the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee in the ABA Section
of Business Law, as stating that“[t]his could have a spillover outside the bankruptcy context. . . .
For example, Congress could apply the same rationale to the tax arena and start to regulate the
content of advice that tax attorneys give to clients about lawful ways to minimize tax
liabilities.”).
15. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Sept. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1574134,
consolidated with Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, ___S. Ct. ___ (Sept. 30, 2009), 2009 WL
2189681.
16. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
17. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
18. 18 U.S.C.A § 2339A(b)(3) (West Supp. 2009).
19. 8 U.S.C.A § 1189 (West 2005).
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a).
21. § 2339A(b)(3).
22. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009).
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portion of the prohibition on “expert advice or assistance” language
was void for vagueness as applied because it “cover[s] constitutionally
23
protected advocacy.” The court justified its position by reasoning
that the “requirement for clarity is enhanced when criminal sanctions
are at issue or when the statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic
24
First Amendment freedoms.”
In petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Attorney General
Holder argued that the provisions are not vague and, “[i]n any event .
. . regulate[] conduct, not speech, and do[] not violate the First
25
Amendment.” In opposition, the Humanitarian Law Group
countered that the “‘expert advice’ provisions criminalize speech on
the basis of its content,” and argued that the Ninth Circuit’s
26
determination should be affirmed.
As in Milavetz, the Supreme Court’s treatment of this federal
statutory constraint on attorney advice may have significant
ramifications for lawyers and clients. A third case also bears on this
issue, questioning the impact of a client’s reliance on bad advice.
C. Padilla v. Kentucky: Attorney Misadvice
27

Padilla v. Kentucky involves a Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claim brought by a legal permanent resident
whose attorney incorrectly advised him that pleading guilty to three
28
drug-related charges would not result in deportation. Padilla
presents two closely related questions. First, does an attorney have an
affirmative duty to advise a non-citizen client that pleading guilty to
an offense will result in deportation, or is this a “collateral
29
consequence” that would relieve the attorney of such a duty?
Second, if deportation is a collateral consequence, does an attorney’s
misadvice that the guilty plea will not result in deportation constitute
30
ineffective assistance of counsel?
A brief history of this case provides context for the questions
23. Id. at 930.
24. Id. at 928 (quoting Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC,
928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)).
25. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-1498
(U.S. June 4, 2009).
26. Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, Humanitarian Law Project, No. 081498 (U.S. July 6, 2009).
27. Padilla v. Kentucky, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009).
28. Id. at 483.
29. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009).
30. Id.
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presented. The petitioner, Jose Padilla, had lived in the United States
over forty years (and served in the U.S. military during the Vietnam
War) when he was indicted in 2001 on three drug counts related to the
trafficking and possession of marijuana and for failing to have an
31
appropriate tax number on the truck he was driving. Padilla
conferred with his attorney about how to respond to the charges,
32
asking specifically about the consequences of a guilty plea. After his
attorney reassured him that he “did not have to worry about
33
immigration status since he had been in the country so long,” Padilla
pleaded guilty to the drug charges and the other charge was
34
dropped.
The advice from Padilla’s attorney was wrong. Two federal
statutes related to antiterrorism and illegal immigration reform
enacted in 1996 made Padilla’s crime an “aggravated felony” under
the Immigration and Nationalization Act, triggering mandatory
35
deportation following a guilty plea. Padilla sought post-conviction
relief arguing that his attorney’s misadvice about the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of
36
counsel. A divided Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s
request for relief based upon his attorney’s misadvice, holding that
mandatory deportation is a “collateral consequence[] . . . outside the
37
scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”
Like Milavetz and Holder, Padilla raises critical questions about a
lawyer’s obligation and ability to provide accurate and complete
advice to a client as well as a lawyer’s duty of competence. For
example, as previously discussed, the ABA Model Rules mandate that
attorneys provide competent representation to a client, which
includes “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
38
reasonably necessary for the representation.” As the ABA set forth
in its amicus curiae brief in support of Padilla, “under the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards, a lawyer’s duty of competence includes
the duty to be informed about the consequences of a client’s guilty
31. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Brief of Petitioner at 5–7, supra note 29 (citing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b) (West 2005)).
36. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
37. Id. at 485.
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (2009). See also KY. SCR 3.130(1.1)
(adopting Model Rule 1.1).
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plea, and to advise the client accordingly.” Furthermore, the ABA
Standards specifically “provide that a lawyer should advise a noncitizen client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea
40
because they will frequently be of critical importance to the client.”
Though Milavetz, Holder, and Padilla involve different rights and
protections, bankruptcy debtors, humanitarian workers, and criminal
defendants all face harsh consequences from incomplete or wrong
advice from their attorneys. To the extent the Court favors the
arguments in Milavetz and Holder that the First Amendment protects
attorney advice from federal statutory constraints, the Court should
likewise rule here that Padilla’s plea cannot stand given counsel’s
misadvice. Another case on the Court’s docket, Wood v. Allen,
identifies comparable concerns for clients in a different context: an
attorney’s insufficient experience.
D. Wood v. Allen: Attorney Inexperience
41

Wood v. Allen presents an issue certain to resonate with law
students and newly practicing lawyers, as well as with the more senior
attorneys who train and supervise them. The case concerns the degree
to which an attorney’s inexperience plays a role in an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The case originates from a challenge to
the sentence received by the petitioner, Holly Wood, “a black man
with an IQ less than 70. . . . [who was] sentenced to death for a capital
42
murder.” During the penalty phase of the trial, Wood “was
represented by Kenneth Trotter, a recently-admitted lawyer who
43
lacked any criminal law experience.” Though two more experienced
trial counsel worked on the case, (and Alabama law at the time
required attorneys appointed to capital murder cases to have at
44
minimum five years of experience in criminal law), the sentencing
45
process fell to Trotter alone. Wood argued that Trotter’s efforts were
“woefully inadequate” and that “[d]espite . . . clear evidence of mental
impairments, neither Trotter nor either of his co-counsel pursued that

39. Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–6,
Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009) (citing relevant ABA Model Rules and
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389 (2009).
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Wood v. Allen, No. 08-9156 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2009)
(citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 3, n.1 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (1994)).
45. Id. at 3.
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46

evidence as a mitigating factor.”
47
Applying the Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective
assistance of counsel—that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant—a divided panel of the
48
Eleventh Circuit rejected Wood’s argument. Untroubled by Trotter’s
lack of experience, the majority instead focused on the fact that two
other experienced attorneys also worked on the case. In dissent,
however, Judge Barkett lamented what she described as “egregious
failures of Wood’s defense counsel to investigate and develop
available mitigating evidence for the penalty phase,” failures that
“epitomize[d] the sort of deficient performance that an ineffective
49
assistance claim exists to guard against.”
Devoting over twenty pages solely to the issue of whether
Trotter’s inexperience caused ineffective counsel, the dissent noted
several concerns. Trotter had been practicing law for less than six
months and conveyed his nervousness about handling the case, yet
50
received primary responsibility for the penalty phase of the trial. He
“expressed his frustration at the lack of supervision and guidance he
was receiving in a letter to . . . the Southern Poverty Law Center,
stating, ‘I have been stressed out over this case and don’t have anyone
51
with whom to discuss the case, including the two other attorneys.’”
The dissent observed that “[h]e realized too late what any reasonably
prepared attorney would have known: that evidence of Wood’s mental
impairments could have served as mitigating evidence and deserved
investigation so that it could properly be presented before
52
sentencing.” Thus, the dissent concluded, “[d]ue to Trotter’s
inexperience, and [the two senior attorneys’] lack of participation in
preparation for the penalty phase, no investigation of Wood’s mental
retardation was conducted at all, and that alone is the reason it was
53
never presented to the jury in mitigation.” The dissent also agreed
54
with the district court that this ineffectiveness prejudiced Wood.

46. Id. at 4.
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
48. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389
(2009) (holding that failure to present evidence of Wood’s mental retardation did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel).
49. Id. at 1315 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1316 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1318 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1322 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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A reversal by the Supreme Court would have a range of
implications for inexperienced lawyers and their supervising
attorneys. It would signal the seriousness of attorneys’ ethical and
55
professional obligations to seek assistance when necessary and to
56
provide appropriate supervision of junior attorneys. This appeal also
indirectly implicates an evolving debate among legal educators on the
training and preparation that law students receive prior to entering
law practice. Similarly, the Wood case intersects with Milavetz and
Padilla in raising questions about minimum levels of competence that
a client can expect from an attorney. Here, however, the primary issue
is the lawyer’s strategy, or means employed to pursue the client’s
objectives, rather than the giving of advice.
Unlike the advice cases, where it is clear whether an attorney has
offered prohibited or incorrect advice, inexperience is not easily
defined. As the ABA Model Rules explain, “[a] lawyer need not
necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal
problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long
57
experience.” The most difficult aspect of this case for the Court will
be drawing the line as to when, if ever, the inexperience of an attorney
translates into ineffective assistance of counsel.
E. Holland v. Florida: Attorney Negligence
An attorney’s duties of competence, diligence, and communication
58
all are at issue in Holland v. Florida , another ineffective assistance of
counsel case. This matter involves a death row inmate’s late-filed
federal habeas appeal. Though Holland, the inmate, repeatedly
contacted his court-appointed attorney about filing his habeas
59
petition, his attorney missed the filing date.

55. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (“In determining
whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant
factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general
experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and
study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or
associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.”).
56. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 5.1 (addressing “responsibilities of
partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers”).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
58. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, ___ S. Ct. ___ (Oct. 13,
2009), 2009 WL 2134374.
59. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1337.
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Holland then proceeded pro se, filing the petition on his own and
requesting equitable tolling, or an extension, of the deadline based
60
upon his attorney’s “gross negligence.” The statute of limitations to
file a federal habeas corpus petition provides for equitable tolling
when two standards are met. First, the petitioner must show he
diligently pursued his rights. Second, he must show that “some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
61
filing.”
The Eleventh Circuit held that “[p]ure professional negligence”
62
was not enough to qualify for equitable tolling. While the court
assumed that the attorney’s failure to file a federal habeas petition
63
“despite [Holland’s] repeated instructions to do so” constituted
gross negligence, it determined that “no allegation of lawyer
negligence or of failure to meet a lawyer’s standard of care . . . can rise
to the level of egregious attorney misconduct that would entitle
64
[Holland] to equitable tolling.”
In his Supreme Court appeal, Holland took issue with “[t]he
Eleventh Circuit’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge that ‘gross
65
negligence’ is sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” He contended
that the Eleventh Circuit’s test conflicts with other circuits and
66
establishes a “near-impossible standard to meet.” In the opposition
brief, Florida suggested that Holland’s own behavior, including not
answering “at least eight letters” written by his attorney, should be
taken into account, and further argued that equitable tolling is not
warranted in this case because Holland’s attorney’s failure to file a
timely federal habeas petition “was merely ordinary attorney
67
negligence.”
Like many of the lawyering cases before the Court this term,
Holland implicates important duties owed by a lawyer to the client.
For example, the ABA Model Rules demand minimum levels of
68
69
diligence and communication. A lawyer also is required under the
60. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 4–5, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. May 13,
2009).
61. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 548 U.S.
408, 418 (2005)).
62. Holland, 539 F.3d at 1339.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 60, at 7.
66. Id. at 7–8.
67. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 13, Holland v. Florida, No. 09-5327 (U.S. Sept. 11,
2009).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 (2009)(“A lawyer shall act with reasonable

12 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POL'Y SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:1

Model Rules to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation” and must “consult with the client as to
70
the means by which they are to be pursued.” While the Supreme
71
Court has been reluctant to “constitutionalize” standards of
professional conduct, it has looked to the Model Rules for evaluating
attorney behavior in evaluating the Sixth Amendment right of a
72
criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel, and may do so
in Holland and the other ineffective assistance of counsel cases as
well.
F. Smith v. Spisak: Attorney Loyalty and Strategy
73

Smith v. Spisak presents yet another claim of constitutionally
ineffective lawyering, this time based upon a lawyer’s trial strategy at
closing argument. Defendant Spisak was convicted in 1983 of four
74
murders at Cleveland State University. He pled not guilty by reason
75
of insanity, but admitted to the murders. During the trial he claimed
76
to be a follower of Adolf Hitler. Though a number of experts were
prepared to testify about Spisak’s mental illness, they were excluded
77
from supporting his insanity claim.
In the closing argument of the sentencing phase, Spisak’s attorney
“repeatedly stress[ed] the brutality of the crimes and demean[ed]
78
[Spisak].” He described each murder in graphic detail, made little
mention of Spisak’s mental illness, and “rambl[ed] incoherently . . .

diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
mirror the relevant obligations of the ABA Model Rules. See FLORIDA RULES REGULATING
THE BAR, R. 4-1.1, R. 4-1.2, R. 4-1.3, R. 4-1.4 (2009).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.4(a)(3),(4) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter [and] promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.”).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.2.
71. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165(1986). Nix looked to the Model Rules for guidance
but cautioned that “[w]hen examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow
the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to
consitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct.” Id.
72. Id.
73. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. granted and case remanded,
Hudson v. Spisak, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), on remand, Spisak v. Hudson, 512 F.3d 852 (6th Cir.
2008), reh’ng en banc denied, 512 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Smith v. Spisak, 129 S.
Ct. 1319 (2009).
74. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688–90 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting State v. Spisak, 521
N.E.2d 800, 800–01 (1988)),
75. Id. at 688, 690.
76. Id. at 688.
77. Id. at 691-703.
78. Id. at 705.
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79

about integrity in the legal system.” The district court found the
argument to be “an appropriate part of trial counsel’s strategy to
confront the heinousness of the murders before the prosecution had
80
the opportunity to do so.” The Sixth Circuit disagreed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “in pursuing this
course, [Spisak’s attorney] abandoned the duty of loyalty owed to [his
81
client].” The court was particularly concerned that the attorney’s
“hostility toward [Spisak] aligned [him] with the prosecution against
82
his own client.” Furthermore, the court observed, “[m]uch of
[Spisak’s attorney’s] argument during the closing of mitigation could
have been made by the prosecution, and if it had, would likely have
83
been grounds for a successful prosecutorial misconduct claim.” The
84
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas.
Ohio argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that Spisak’s
attorney’s closing argument was “reasonable when viewed from
85
counsel’s perspective at the time.” Yet, a group of prominent trial
advocacy law professors filed an amicus brief reaching the opposite
86
conclusion. They explained that Spisak’s attorney’s closing argument
unconstitutionally prejudiced his case, observing that “a closing
argument that magnifies and obsesses on weaknesses, while discussing
strengths in an indirect and at times incomprehensible manner, is
87
below any reasonable measure of professional competence.” They
suggested that a holding to the contrary “would teach generations of
future lawyers incorrect lessons about how to present a case, and
would leave clients—both Mr. Spisak and future clients in like cases—
without the reasonable assurance of actual assistance of counsel to
88
which the Sixth Amendment entitles them.” As in the other
ineffective assistance of counsel cases, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Spisak will address the key elements of a lawyer’s duties and
obligations to the client, and will determine when, if ever, a failure to
fulfill those duties rises to the level of a constitutional violation.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 706.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Smith v. Spisak, No. 08-724 (U.S. May 22, 2009).
86. Brief of Stephen Lubet et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2–3, Smith v.
Spisak, No. 08-724 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2009).
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
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G. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter: Attorney-Client Privilege
89

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter asks “whether a party has an
immediate appeal . . . of a district court’s order finding waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and compelling production of privileged
90
materials.” But the outcome will impact far more than procedural
functions. As the petitioner Mohawk argues, an immediate appeal is
imperative to protecting attorney-client privilege in this situation.
This case involves an unlawful termination dispute between
91
Mohawk Industries and its employee, Norman Carpenter. During
discovery, Carpenter requested information that Mohawk refused to
provide on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Carpenter moved to
compel discovery. While the district court agreed that the disputed
communications were privileged, it concluded that Mohawk “had
implicitly waived the attorney-client privilege” through a response
92
filed in an unrelated action.
Mohawk appealed under the collateral order doctrine, which
provides an exception to the final judgment rule and the
corresponding principle that “[g]enerally, discovery orders are not
93
final orders . . . for purposes of obtaining appellate jurisdiction.”
Under this exception, “an order is appealable [only] if it (1)
conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action;
94
and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
The Eleventh Circuit found the first two prongs satisfied, but held
“that a discovery order [implicating] the attorney-client privilege is
95
[not] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
96
Acknowledging a split among the circuits, the court suggested that
mandamus or a challenge to a contempt order following
97
noncompliance provide alternative mechanisms for review,
89. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc. 541 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert.
granted, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 129 S. Ct. 1041 (2009).
90. Reply Brief of Petitioner at i, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678 (U.S. Jan.
6, 2009), 2009 WL 52074.
91. Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1050.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1052 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006)).
94. Id. at 1052 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)).
95. Id. at 1052.
96. See id. at 1053 (citing cases from the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits holding that the
collateral order doctrine allows review of an order compelling the production of attorney-client
communication, and cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits
that it does not).
97. See Mohawk, 541 F.3d at 1048, 1054–55.
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notwithstanding the practical difficulties associated with these options
98
and the extraordinary costs associated with a new trial.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mohawk focused on the
importance of the attorney-client privilege in the context of the
justice system—an issue glossed over in the Eleventh Circuit
99
opinion. Moreover, Mohawk reasoned that if it must “wait until after
a final judgment to appeal the District Court’s order, the right [it]
seeks to protect, namely, the right not to disclose privileged
information, will have been destroyed. It is this right of non-disclosure
100
that is at the heart of the attorney-client privilege.” Mohawk went
on to observe: “as the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have recognized,
an appeal after final judgment cannot remedy the breach of
confidentiality occasioned by erroneous disclosure of privileged
material . . . . Once the privileged information is disclosed, there is no
101
way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure.”
This case strikes at the same concerns about an attorney’s ability
to advise her client as do the preceding cases of Milavetz, Padilla, and
Wood addressing attorney advice. The rationale of the attorney-client
privilege—“the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law”—is to “encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
102
and administration of justice.”
Without that full and frank communication, an attorney may not
be able to offer essential advice. Similarly, “corporations may be less
likely to engage in internal investigations to ensure their compliance
with the law because the assurance that the legal findings and
conclusions resulting from such investigations could be maintained in
103
confidence would be weakened considerably.” When a client is
forced to produce documents protected by the attorney-client
98. See, e.g., Michael P. Shea, Allow Prompt Appeals, NAT’L L. J., April 13, 2009 at 23 col.
1 (explaining that “mandamus—an extraordinary remedy reserved for ‘clear abuses of
discretion’ by the trial judge—is a poor fit for orders denying privilege claims” and that the
contempt order for non-compliance “is even worse” in that for most parties “enduring the
penalties and stigma associated with a contempt sanction is simply not a feasible option”); see
also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 32–40, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678 (U.S.
April 27, 2009), 2009 WL 1155404 (discussing problems associated with mandamus and
contempt).
99. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 98 at 19.
100. Id. at 11–12.
101. Id. at 12 (quotation and citations omitted).
102. Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
103. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 98, at 32-40.
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privilege only to learn at a trial’s end that the documents ought not to
have been revealed, the privilege exists in theory but not in practical
application.
Approaching this case from the standpoint of the client’s interests
offers further justification for the position that an immediate appeal is
warranted. Such a ruling in the context of protecting attorney-client
privilege certainly would be consistent with the prioritization of
protections on attorney advice and the client’s receipt of that advice
as noted in the prior cases studied in this essay. The next case turns to
a related concern—access to attorney advice.
H. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn: Attorney Fees
104

At issue in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn is when, if ever, “a
reasonable attorney’s fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute . . .
[may] be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results
obtained when these factors already are included in the lodestar
105
calculation.” This case stems from a Georgia federal district court’s
award of more than $10.5 million to a group of attorneys who
represented a class action of 3,000 foster children against the State of
106
Georgia. Of that award, $4.5 million represented an enhancement to
the lodestar calculation, based upon the district court’s assessment
that the quality of legal representation was “far superior to what
consumers of legal services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta could
107
reasonably expect to receive.”
A unanimous panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
108
court’s award, though it did so with serious reservations.
In

104. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel Winn, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’ng en banc denied,
547 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1907 (2009).
105. Brief for Petitioner at i, Purdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. June 22,
2009) (emphasis added). The lodestar formula includes twelve factors for determining an
appropriate fee: “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by
the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n. 3
(1983).
106. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 105 at 4–8.
107. Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2006). The
District Court further observed that “[a]fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and federal judge,
the Court is unaware of any other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable
result on such a comprehensive scale.” Id. at 1290.
108. Perdue, 532 F.3d at 1236–38.
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particular, the court observed that the district court’s enhancement
109
“cannot be squared with the Supreme Court [precedent],” and “that
110
the enhancement to the lodestar amount in this case was improper.”
Nevertheless, “under the prior panel precedent rule [the court was]
111
not free to decide the enhancement issue.” As such, though the
court was “convinced” that the prior Eleventh Circuit precedent “was
wrong and conflict[ed] with relevant Supreme Court decisions,” it felt
112
“bound to follow it” and upheld the award.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, the State argued that the
results obtained and the quality of work done in a case should be
113
considered only when calculating the basic lodestar fee amount. In
other words, it constitutes double-counting to consider those factors
again in awarding an enhancement, bonus, or other additional
amount.
In response, the attorneys seeking enforcement of the fee award
focused on the district court’s decision and on the Eleventh Circuit’s
denial of a rehearing en banc. Judge Wilson wrote an opinion
concurring in the denial and finding that “[s]everal decades of
established precedent make it clear that district judges are vested with
discretion to enhance a fee in accordance with a federal-fee shifting
statute, in the ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ case, when there is specific
evidence in the record to support an exceptional result and superior
114
performance.”
There is no question that these factors are appropriate for
calculating a reasonable lodestar amount; however, that these factors
should be grounds for a de facto bonus is a conclusion unlikely to be
reached by a majority of the Supreme Court. This is especially true
given that the omission of such enhancement would not discourage or
115
thwart future representations. As with the other cases, professional
109. Id. at 1225.
110. Id. at 1233.
111. Id. at 1236 (citing NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987) and
Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988)).
112. Id. at 1238 (citing cases including Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e are not permitted to reach a result contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely because
we are convinced it is wrong . . . .”)).
113. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 105 at 13–14.
114. Brief in Opposition at 10, Purdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. March 4,
2009) (quoting 547 F.3d at 1320) (citations omitted).
115. In fact, the lawyers in Perdue took on and successfully carried out their representation
without any expectation of an enhancement. See Marcia Coyle, Advocacy Group to Defend
Hike in Fee Award, N.Y. L. J., April 13, 2009 at 1 col. 3 (interviewing Marcia Robinson Lowry,
executive director of Children’s Rights, Inc. (group of lawyers representing plaintiff class in
Perdue), who explained “that such enhancements were rare, occurring on average only once
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conduct codes also have a role here. For example, Model Rule 1.5
116
reinforces the factors for determining the reasonableness of a fee,
and the Model Rules also ensure that “[a]n attorney who accepts a
case arising under a fee-shifting statue is ethically obligated, as is any
attorney in any case, to represent her client to the best of her
117
ability,” regardless of compensation.
I.

Astrue v. Ratliff: Attorney Fees Again
118

Astrue v. Ratliff offers a second opportunity for the Court to
evaluate attorneys’ fees in the context of federal fee-shifting statutes.
At stake in this case is whether a fee award belongs to the attorney or
the client. Attorney Catherine Ratliff “successfully represented two
claimants in their efforts to receive benefits from the Social Security
119
Administration.” After her victory, she requested payment of her
120
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The
EAJA is a federal fee-shifting statute that allows “prevailing parties”
in civil actions against the United States to recover fees and other
costs in certain cases. The district court granted Ratliff’s request, but
the government reduced her award because of debt that one of her
121
clients owed the United States Government. Ratliff challenged the
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that it
constituted an illegal seizure, but the district court held she lacked
standing “because the fees were awarded to the parties, not their

each year in the entire federal system. Her own organization ‘has never sought and never
received an enhancement’ she said in an interview last week”).
116. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.5(a) (7) (2009) (“The factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include . . . the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.”).
117. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Purdue v. Kenny A.
ex. rel. Winn, No. 08-970 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R.
1.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client,” which “requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”) and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008) (stating a
lawyer should “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s
cause or endeavor” and must “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”)).
118. Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Astrue v. Ratliff, ___ S. Ct.
___ (Sep. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1146426.
119. Id. at 801.
120. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412.
121. Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801. The amount at issue relates to only one of the clients, a Social
Security claimant proceeding in forma pauperis. The court awarded Ratliff fees and expenses in
the amount of $2,239.35, all of which was offset by the government to satisfy the claimant’s preexisting federal debt. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322
(U.S. April 28, 2009), 2009 WL 1155415.
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attorney.”
The Eight Circuit reversed, holding that “EAJA attorneys’ fees
123
are awarded to the prevailing parties’ attorneys.” It did so in the
face of contradictory precedent from other jurisdictions, notably the
124
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. The court noted, however, that the
result was based upon controlling Eighth Circuit cases and “[w]ere [it]
deciding this case in the first instance, [it might] well agree with [the]
125
sister circuits.”
Predictably, in its petition for certiorari, the government argued
that the Supreme Court should follow those courts holding that fees
awarded to a prevailing party under the EAJA are property of the
126
client, not the attorney. Ratliff, for her part, countered that “the
Eighth Circuit was correct in holding that attorneys are entitled to
receive EAJA awards in Social Security cases notwithstanding the
government’s purported offset rights to collect debts owed by
127
clients.”
Further, she noted that the Eighth Circuit’s
acknowledgement of an attorney’s “protectable property interest in
an EAJA fee once it is awarded” was a position “find[ing] strong
support in the long-established rule that an attorney’s interest in a fee
for her efforts creates a lien allowing equitable tracing of funds that
128
have been transferred to other creditors of the client.” Thus, it
follows that “the attorney’s equitable lien is itself a property interest
subject to constitutional protection against government confiscation,”
irrespective of “who has the right to apply for an attorney fee . . . or
129
even to receive it in the first instance.” Ratliff also suggested that
the consequences of a reversal would leave few attorneys, if any, to
assist Social Security claimants given that they risk receiving no
compensation, “even in those cases where they not only succeed, but
130
[also] where the government’s position was not . . . justified.”
Both Purdue and Astrue stand apart from most of the other cases
previewed in this essay, as they do not directly address a primary
function of the attorney-client relationship. Nevertheless,
compensation guaranteed by a fee-shifting statute undoubtedly
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 801–02 (citing cases).
Id. at 802.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 7.
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 21, Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 25, 2009).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 29.
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influences attorneys to take on representations where parties
otherwise would be left with no legal advice (and, in cases like Astrue,
with no assistance in obtaining wrongly-denied benefits). Thus, in an
important way, the attorney fees cases are interwoven with those
cases addressing attorney advice and, in particular, the right or ability
of clients to access necessary legal representation and advice.
J.

Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee: Attorney Immunity

The final case previewed in this essay demands that the Court
offer much-needed clarification to the doctrine of prosecutorial
131
immunity. Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee dates back to 1978
when two black teenagers, Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington,
were convicted of murdering a white, retired Council Bluffs police
132
133
department captain. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. In
2002, finding that the prosecutors failed to disclose evidence of an
alternative suspect and coerced false testimony, the Iowa Supreme
134
Court reversed Harrington’s conviction, and McGhee was allowed
to enter a plea to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of
135
time served.
The two men then brought civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983 against Pottawattamie County and the two former county
136
prosecutors. The prosecutors argued that they were entitled to
137
absolute immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman, in which the Supreme
Court held that prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity at trial
for their prosecutorial acts but only qualified immunity for
138
Imbler did not provide
investigatory or administrative acts.
definitive guidance, however, as to what differentiates a prosecutorial
139
The
activity from an investigatory or administrative activity.
McGhee case provides the Court a window to do so; in fact, it offers
an opportunity for the Court to reconsider Imbler’s holding in its
entirety.
The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors
131. McGee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009).
132. 547 F.3d at 925.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
138. Id. at 430–31.
139. Id.
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based on withholding of exculpatory evidence, but denied immunity
for the claims based on the allegations that the prosecutors had
coerced false testimony from witnesses that later was introduced at
140
141
trial and resulted in the convictions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
As McGhee and Harrington observed, “[w]ithout the fabricated
testimony, there was no evidence connecting plaintiffs to the
142
murder.”
The former prosecutors petitioned the Supreme Court to address
whether they “may be subjected to a civil trial and potential damages
for a wrongful conviction and incarceration where [they] allegedly
violated a criminal defendant’s ‘substantive due process’ rights by
procuring false testimony during the criminal investigation and then
143
introduced that same testimony against the defendant at trial.”
Though the former prosecutors were careful to note that they had not
144
conceded McGhee and Harrington’s version of the facts, they did
not dispute them in the appeal. Rather, they made two arguments.
First, they contended that the Eight Circuit’s decision conflicts with
145
the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons that the
procurement of false testimony does not violate the Constitution and
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for the use of such false
146
testimony. Second, they suggested that the Eighth Circuit’s decision
conflicts with other Supreme Court precedent, particularly with
147
regard to the Court’s “function test” for prosecutorial immunity. In
sum, they made the case for “absolute[] immun[ity] from claims that
they introduced perjured testimony . . . [as] [s]uch claims go to the
heart of a prosecutor’s function as an advocate for the state in judicial
148
proceedings.”
In opposing the appeal, Harrington and McGhee both disputed
the claim of a circuit split and distinguished Buckley as involving a
different situation—one in which one group of prosecutors coerced

140. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 475 F. Supp. 862, 927 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
141. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932 (citation omitted).
142. Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee at 6, Pottawattamie County, Iowa v.
McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March 17, 2009). Accord Brief in Opposition for Respondent
Harrington at 10, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March 17, 2009).
143. Brief of Petitioner at i, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. July 13, 2009).
144. See Petitioner’s Reply to Brief in Opposition at 11, McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. March
31, 2009). (“Petitioners consistently have maintained that even if the alleged facts were true,
respondents’ claims must fail because petitioners are immune as a matter of law.”).
145. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994).
146. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 143, at 2–3.
147. See id. at 7–8 and 34–36 (discussing cases).
148. Id. at 5.
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false testimony, while another group of prosecutors used that
149
testimony at trial. Furthermore, both argued that the Eighth Circuit
properly applied the functional test in reaching prosecutors’ actions
taken outside the advocatory functions (e.g. the procurement of false
150
testimony and the introduction of said testimony at trial). McGhee
also argued that relief must be available in cases like this to deter
prosecutorial misconduct, or prosecutors would be “free to fabricate
evidence during criminal investigations because they would know
151
there was virtually no possibility of ever being punished for it.”
To be sure, strong protections are accorded to prosecutorial
152
immunity, and for good reason. Yet, cases like this expose areas of
potential prosecutorial abuse and have led some commentators to
153
argue against absolute immunity. The McGhee case also illustrates
another example of the role that attorney codes of conduct should
play. Even if the Court determines that fabrication of evidence and
use of that evidence at trial does not rise to the level of a claim here,
there is no question that these allegations ought to be addressed by
154
the attorney discipline system and ethical conduct codes. Last,
McGhee exemplifies a common thread among all of these pending
cases in that it demands guidance about the role and responsibilities
of an attorney balanced against the rights of the client or defendant.

149. Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 16–17; Brief in
Opposition for Respondent Harrington, supra note 142, at 12–14.
150. Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 9–10, Brief in
Opposition for Respondent Harrington, supra note 142, at 13–14.
151. Brief in Opposition for Respondent McGhee, supra note 142, at 19.
152. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent
Developments, 24 TOURO L. REV. 473 (2008) (discussing principles of absolute immunity and
qualified immunity when government officials are sued for money damages).
153. See, e.g., Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1135, 1138 (1996) (arguing for the end of absolute immunity so that “incompetent or malevolent
prosecutors [may be] subject to civil liability for their misdeeds”).
154. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8 (2009) (requiring prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and to “remedy” a conviction upon awareness that
the defendant did not commit the crime); Iowa S. Ct. R. 32.3.8(a) (prohibiting prosecution of a
charge prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause); Iowa S. Ct. R. 32.3.8(d)
(prohibiting a prosecutor from knowingly failing to disclose exculpatory evidence). See also
Brief for the Nat. Assoc. Ass’t U.S. Atty’s. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. July 20, 2009) (“[P]rosecutors who
engage in misconduct are already subject to discipline by a variety of institutions, state bar
associations, and the judges before whom they appear. In the most extreme cases, prosecutors
may face criminal sanctions for their misconduct.”).
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III. CONCLUSION
155

During a typical term the Supreme Court hears perhaps one,
156
157
two, or maybe three cases addressing issues related to the role of
158
an attorney or the practice of law, or sometimes none at all. To date,
ten cases have been granted review by the Court and even more may
159
be added before the term concludes. Not only is the number of
160
cases in this category unusual, but also the questions presented by
all of the cases encompass core facets of the law of lawyering. Thus,
the placement of these matters on the Supreme Court’s docket is
remarkable both for the quantity of cases and their substance. Each
case individually addresses issues that have the potential to
substantially alter the day-to-day practice of law for attorneys in a
variety of settings. Viewing the matters collectively exposes their
interconnections and the dramatic impact that their outcomes may
have on the Supreme Court’s legal profession jurisprudence.
Attorneys, along with their clients, will want to follow the Court’s
rulings closely.

155. For example, during the 2006–2007 term, the Court heard only one case addressing
matters related to attorneys and the practice of law: Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007) (attorneys’ fees). See Survey of Supreme Court Cases
Containing a Legal Ethics Issue from the 1998–1999 Term to Present (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). It should be noted for purposes of this essay that cases involving regulation
of the judiciary or judicial misconduct have been excluded.
156. For example, during the 1998–1999 term, the Court heard two cases related to
attorneys and the practice of law: Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999) (addressing attorneys’
fees); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999) (addressing prosecutorial misconduct).
157. For example, during the 2003–2004 term, the Court heard three cases involving
attorneys and the practice of law: Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (addressing ineffective
assistance of counsel); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (addressing attorneys’ fees);
and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (addressing prosecutorial misconduct). With the
exception of the current 2009–2010 term, three cases are the most appearing on any Supreme
Court docket since at least the 1998–1999 term, and likely previous terms. See Survey, supra
note 155.
158. For example, during the 2005–2006 term, the Court heard no cases central to the role
of an attorney or the practice of law. See Findlaw 2005–2006 Supreme Court Case Index,
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/caseindex2005.html (listing cases heard during the
2005–2006 term).
159. The standard practice of the Supreme Court is to continue adding cases for review at
least until January of the current term.
160. See supra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.

